

Decreasing and Obstructing the Arab Palestinians' Right of Access to al-Quds/ Jerusalem City

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Abstract

The Israeli state built a separation wall between the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and areas that include al-Quds, East Jerusalem and Israel. This wall adds another mechanism of control and limitation on the Palestinians' access to East Jerusalem; it separates the city from its natural surroundings and from its urban and rural hinterland. Since Israel occupied and appended East Jerusalem in 1967, the Palestinians have a special status as "Permanent Residents," not citizens, and they suffer from a bad situation which decreases and obstructs their right to the city. This paper aims to throw light on the shadows of the implications and consequences that originate from the building of the separation wall in the City of Jerusalem, and on the right of the Palestinians to the city. Our approach in presenting and discussing these implications and the consequences of building the wall is strongly shaped by the Lefebvrian conceptualization of the idea of city citizenship. The paper was written with an awareness of the deep geopolitical conflict over Jerusalem. This conflict and the construction of the separation wall have a direct negative impact on the possibility of securing, or even enabling, the Palestinians' right to the city.

Key words: the right to city, right of access, Jerusalem, al-Quds, separation wall, Israelis, Palestinians.

Introduction

Finalizing the building of the separation wall around al-Quds (Jerusalem) has had wide-scale consequences and ramifications in Jerusalem and its surroundings, which have been addressed by various studies (Brooks et al., 2005;

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Khamaisi, 2005; Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2006; Kimhi, 2006; Brooks, 2007; Fenster and Shlomo, 2011; Medzini, 2016). These negative consequences include fragmenting the warp and woof of the urban fabric in Jerusalem and hindering the possibility of Jerusalem's becoming the heart and capital of any future Palestinian state. In addition, the separation wall has a wide range of damaging effects on daily life for Palestinians living in and around Jerusalem. Studies have also addressed the wall's consequences from the standpoint of Jerusalem's being a city divided in reality and suffering from political and ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, various consequences for Jerusalem of the wall's construction are still unclear and must be examined and understood. This study is an additional link in the chain of research that examines the separation wall's consequences on the city structure and its surroundings. Our goal is to examine the wall's potential to shrink and truncate *the right to the city* for Palestinian society in Jerusalem. Our approach is strongly shaped by the Lefebvrian conceptualization of the idea of city citizenship, which was developed by the French sociologist and thinker Lefebvre (1991; 1996), given greater currency by Harvey, and developed to the point of becoming the slogan of Radical City Democracy (Harvey, 2003; Purcell, 2002). The construction of the wall around Jerusalem has fragmented Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods and has isolated them from their surroundings, thereby inhibiting and undermining freedom of movement within the urban network of East Jerusalem, which had evolved organically until it was truncated by the wall (Brooks et al., 2005). This fragmentation prohibits realization of the right to the city and enforces an estrangement between the Palestinians and their urban space. They are unable to live and move freely, and they do not have an opportunity to formulate and produce the urban space. Moreover, based on Israeli assumptions, the wall's path may determine the urban borders of the "unified" Jerusalem as well as the geopolitical borders of the State of Israel (Khamaisi, 2008). The questions raised

in light of this assumption are: "Would a post-wall Jerusalem be a natural city in which it is possible to practice the right to city citizenship after it is transformed from an occupied city in a state of conflict, urban fragmentation, and geo-ethnic division into a city whose borders are an extension of the wall? What will be the nature of the urban networks that will evolve in the wake of the wall's construction? and Will that transformed situation deprive the Palestinians of the ability to ensure international legitimization of East Jerusalem as the capital of their independent state?

The assumption this article seeks to address revolves around the potential of the wall to discredit the idea of the open and stable city, an idea that is advanced by numerous visions for the future of Jerusalem. Moreover, the wall as currently constructed, already makes it impossible to realize the right to the city, and it truncates the development of a metropolitan Jerusalem. In fact, it enforces ethnic, national and cultural localization at the neighborhood level and fails to provide a developed public city space, which is one of the major ingredients for the development of a city network in which an equal and free right of city citizenship is practiced. Therefore, the completed wall will not only weaken Jerusalem and transform it into a frontier city for the Palestinians, as well as the Israelis, it will also exacerbate the national and geopolitical conflicts surrounding the city.

Our study begins with a theoretical overview of the concept of the right to the city, which we will attempt to expand to accommodate the reality of a city in a state of conflict, ethnically divided, with huge gaps in living standards among its neighborhoods, and witnessing significant shortages in the provision of infrastructure and services in the Arab Palestinian neighborhoods (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003). We will seek to answer the question of whether it is possible to utilize and apply the idea of the right to the city, using Jerusalem as a paradigm case of a nationally and ethnically divided city (Bollens, 2000; Auga et al., 2005).

The second part of this study presents a brief overview of the evolution of the geopolitical reality of Jerusalem, explaining how the right to the city has been minimized and truncated. The third part addresses the effects and ramifications of the wall, through a discussion of the components of the concept of the right to the city, especially in the wake of minimized public spaces, truncated neighborhoods, and the transformation of the city from an urban space with a semi-integrated functional network based on national and geo-ethnic affiliation into a city formed of secondary ethnic concentrations based on the levels of neighborhoods, villages and conglomerates that are isolated and have no ties among them. Lastly, we conclude this study with an attempt to outline some of the integrating, albeit contradictory, components between the right to the city and the idea of the open city, which are aborted by the wall's construction. Furthermore, we shall indicate some of the steps that must be taken to revive the city functionally and develop an urban network capable of forming the heart of the future Palestinian state and the center of the city of Israel, as opposed to the deep-rooted state of conflict which threatens Jerusalem's development and prosperity. We shall argue for the proposition that ensuring the right to the city for the Israelis hinges on ensuring the right to the city for the Palestinians; otherwise, the state of conflict in the city will worsen and lead to a scenario of self-destruction.

The Notion of the Right to the City and Fencing

Before the concept of "the right to the city" was proposed, urbanologists viewed national citizenship and political centrality as the key factors that determined a city's resources and shaped its decisions, in isolation from the role and right of a city's citizenry and inhabitants to participate in decision making concerning the nature of the city and the means of producing and managing its space. Under a regime of national citizenship and political centrality, the city's citizens and inhabitants had to accept the central governmental decisions imposed on them,

and any right to participate in the formulation and production of the space in which they lived was not recognized. The notion that all of the city's citizens are equal was unacceptable (Purcell, 2002; Jabarin, 2006). The concept of the right to the city stems from guaranteeing people's rights in the city as equal citizens who should have access to resources and the ability to move spatially and functionally within the city's surroundings, without impediments or administrative, physical, or cultural/national barriers (Fenster, 2006). This concept evolved in response to the deliberate and direct restrictions of global geopolitical and economic transformations, which imposed political, economic and functional strictures that handicap an individual's rights in the city space, as they are controlled by a central government, multinational companies, or globalization (Falk, 2000). This national central control may lead to stripping citizens of their right to participate in formulating decisions about the design, planning, management and production of the city space (Holston and Appadurai, 1999). The urbanization process, which the whole world is undergoing, sharp population increases in cities and the concentration of economic resources and governance and decision-making centers in cities (Taylor, 2013) have attracted researchers who are attempting to understand the formation of urban spaces and people's movements within them, and who are monitoring the nature of the relations evolving among city residents in states of stability and conflict (Harvey, 2003). Lefebvre's concept of the right to the city evolved from a reality in which the city represents the society's dropping on the ground in accordance with tangible physical meaning, as well as with intangible perception and discrete meaning, and evolved from making decisions and formulating ideas which determine the city's design model and the formation of its structures. The concept of the right to the city presents itself as a noble form of rights: the right to freedom, and individual and personal rights within the scope of participation and involvement in various societal structures, which include the rights to living,

housing, and work. The idea of the right to the city also includes the rights to creativity, participation, and the allocation of resources, and equality and equity in the capacity to obtain them for all city residents (Lefebvre, 1996).

Moreover, the concept of the right to the city originated from the *production* of the city space; therefore, whoever lives in the city and interacts with it (which is to say, *produces* it) is entitled to demand the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1991). The right to the city is not limited to those who live in the city, but includes as well those who work in it, interact with it, visit it and feel attachment and belonging to it, and those who use its urban and service space and network.

Lefebvre and other researchers who discuss the concept of the right to the city summarize it in two major principles: The right to participation and the right to appropriation (Lefebvre, 1991, 1996; Salmon, 2001). These two rights include equality of participation in using the city space and in formulating and producing it culturally, spatially and ideologically. These concepts are based on a transformation of the personal national right in a participatory liberal democracy to the local and urban levels, which translates to functional perceptions and activities and freedom of movement within the urban space, and whose purpose is to facilitate the right of location in the city in accordance with the desire and freedom associated with individual or economic activity (Firma). Based on the above, metropolitan space was defined as an urban space that enjoys structural contiguity and is divided politically and administratively, but integrated functionally and economically, and enables an individual, a family or an investor to settle freely wherever they deem appropriate, taking into consideration their abilities, available economic resources, and cultural, national and ethnic desires and preferences (Heinelt, 2005). If we add to this definition the right to the city in terms of participating in, managing and formulating the space and appropriating it, then this concept forms a theoretical foundation for

understanding the contradiction between the reality of Jerusalem and the ramifications of the wall's construction, and between truncating and fragmenting the urban space on one hand, and on the other denying the right to the city to the Palestinian people and society, who currently do not enjoy the right on the national level and are being deprived of it on the local level.

Several scientific conferences were held for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the right to the city; eventually it was recognized as a basic human right which must be preserved and guaranteed, even in cases of extraordinary developments such as war. The proposed international declaration for endorsing the right to the city presented the components of the humanitarian right to the city. It stipulated:

The right to the city includes internationally-recognized human rights to housing, social security, work, appropriate living standards, recreation, information, organization and freedom of assembly, water and food, liberation from de-possession, participation and self-expression, health, education, culture, privacy and security, a safe and healthy environment, compensation and legal treatment in case of being subject to a violation, and the collective agreed upon and endorsed human rights, which are guaranteed for all human beings under all circumstances. ... [T]he right to the city incorporates such other urban human rights as the right to occupy and own land, the provision of public transportation, energy, and basic infrastructure, availability of skills and skill development, and obtaining public goods – including natural resources and financing – all as basic and necessary practical elements. The right to the city outlines in its context the countries and local authorities' obligations to respect diversity and the equal rights of the various ethnic, lingual, gender, religious and cultural groups. The right to the city stipulates that all residents of a city possess mutual humanity from which stems the individual and collective rights to

obtaining and maintaining a living place in security, peace and dignity regardless of the civic situation. (The Third International Social Forum, Porto Allegro, January 2004, www.hic-mena/documents).

Our attempt to discuss the wall's ramifications in accordance with the concept of the Lefebvorean idea of the right to the city may be criticized, especially in light of the fact that the idea of the right to the city was devised for cities where there are no geopolitical or national conflicts and whose national realities are decided. The only types of conflicts that characterize those cities are class, socioeconomic and ethnic conflicts between authentic groups and immigrants, and between the various economic classes in them. The residents of those cities are subject to the central government, but the right to the city accords them the right of city citizenship. Jerusalem obviously suffers from a deep conflict over its geopolitical reality and future (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2006); however, we believe that the application of the concept of the right to the city will shed light on the state of Jerusalem, including the contradictions the city suffers from on the individual, collective and national levels, which will be further exacerbated by the construction of the separation wall.

Therefore, the question to be answered in this article is: Does the construction of the wall contribute to preserving the right to the city for those who live in it or interact with it? In order to answer this question, we will review the development of the Israelis' denial of the Palestinian right in Jerusalem by rejecting the Palestinians' freedom of participation, prohibiting any possibility for their involvement in formulating and producing the space and sharing resources, and fragmenting the city and transforming it from a central city into a frontier city, thereby leading to the creation of a diseased city that is dying because of the separation wall.

Regardless of the Palestinians' non-participation in formulating and producing

the urban space, what is the nature of the space they have produced as an alternative, and how did Israel influence the creation/production of such space? Is participation in the space the only means of realizing the Palestinians' right to the city or do the Palestinians have their own space, which existed before Israel? If so, how have they dealt with this space since the occupation and how have they created alternative spaces in Jerusalem's surroundings? And how did the wall contribute to weakening those spaces and exacerbating the problems in Jerusalem by generating a movement of population into the city, which settled in poor and densely populated neighborhoods characterized by the phenomenon of random construction? Needless to say, since the occupation of East Jerusalem and its annexation to the jurisdiction of Israeli law in 1967, Israel has employed governmental techniques of spatial control and population management in a manner that discriminates against the residents of East Jerusalem in many aspects of life, despite its giving the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem the right to participate in municipal elections, which most of the Palestinians refuse because they do not want to grant legitimacy to Israel's occupation and municipal annexation.

The Process of Contraction of the Right to the City

The building of the separation wall and the fence around Jerusalem has fragmented neighborhood networks and capped a process involving the contraction of Palestinians' right to the city as citizens living in it and witnessing its fate. The contraction process began in the middle of the nineteenth century, when foreign colonial missions came to Jerusalem in an effort to control its space. From that time, the urban space in Jerusalem began expanding outside the ancient walls surrounding the Old City (Mustafa, 1997). At the same time, Jerusalem continued to develop within the Old City walls, and its citizens and residents lived in accordance with the traditional models of inhabitation and space management (Akbar, 1995). Moreover, over the years, the villages

surrounding Jerusalem expanded from their nuclei and developed in an organic manner, producing rural spaces that grew and developed in an integrated, organic manner that balanced needs, capabilities and the means of consumption and production. Contiguity and integration among the neighborhoods that developed around the Old City and those that expanded from the villages were achieved eventually to form the city space of Jerusalem. This urban space had developed in an integrated, organic manner, balancing the traditions, the needs, and the available means of consumption and production. However, the foreign missions and the immigration waves of the Zionist Movement settled in Jerusalem and introduced new urban patterns into the physical, functional and administrative structures of the city (Ben Arie, 1979). In 1863, the Jerusalem Municipality was established as an appointed local governance representing the central governance in Istanbul. A major turning point came in 1917, when Jerusalem was occupied by British forces during World War I; the British Mandate was declared in Palestine, and the mandate's central institutions, such as the office of the High Commissioner, settled in Jerusalem. Hence, Jerusalem became a central administrative and political city for the British Mandate in Palestine, adding to its historic, spiritual, religious and symbolic centrality. The urbanization process and urban development continued and included the establishment of modern Palestinian Arab and Jewish neighborhoods outside the wall, neighborhoods which were based on national, class and cultural affiliations. Each ethnic/national group lived in isolation from the other (Tamari, 2002). In the second decade of the twentieth century, conflict broke out between the Jews and Palestinian Arabs. That conflict reached its peak in 1948, when the city was divided geo-politically and physically, and the right to Jerusalem was limited: freedom of movement and settlement was controlled and inhibited within the city's space. During the British Mandate period, official Palestinian Arab participation in formulating the space, through managing, planning and

developing it, was restricted, and the Palestinian Arabs' participation in city citizenship was limited. In fact, the British High Commissioner and his arms were the central body that managed the city's space and formulated its urban network, while the citizens who lived in the city, those who interacted with it and those who immigrated to it for residence or work were practically neutralized in the process of formulating the space and did not constitute a central factor in producing it. However, this does not mean that they failed to produce their own organic space, through which public space was produced on the level of the neighborhoods. Rather, a Palestinian Arab space evolved through the Palestinian Arabs' production of the space as consumers of it, through meeting their needs. This space evolved in accordance with the production and accumulation of private space; therefore, a significant shortage in producing and providing public space was witnessed.

The turning point in inhibiting and truncating the right to the city came in the wake of the 1948 War and the endorsement of the physical and geopolitical division of Jerusalem into two parts. The western part of Jerusalem was subjected to Israeli control, while the eastern part, including the Old City, fell under Jordanian control. This physical division included the establishment of a separating border fence within the city. The war transformed Jerusalem from a geographically, administratively and politically central city into a divided border city suffering from security instability (Benvenisti, 1996). The eastern part of Jerusalem became the center of the West Bank area, which was annexed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and followed Amman, the main central city in the Kingdom, in importance. Between 1948 and 1967, the right to the divided city was subject to checkpoints and barriers that prevented appropriation and participation in public space formulation. In fact, the city structure produced as a consequence of the war was fragmented, since the city itself was divided by physical barriers that made it impossible to travel between its two parts. The

factors determining movement inside the city and into it were the policies of the central Israeli government in the western part of Jerusalem and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the eastern part. During this period of geopolitical division, Jerusalem suffered from backwardness, and its role was minimized, in spite of the fact that West Jerusalem was declared the capital of the state of Israel and East Jerusalem remained the spiritual and religious center of the Arabs and Muslims, as well as a regional center and the second most important city in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. During this period, it was impossible to address the right to a divided and partitioned city. It is true that elections were being held in West Jerusalem to elect representatives in the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality, while representatives in the Arab Jerusalem Municipality in East Jerusalem were being appointed, but in both cases, the central governments dominated the making of decisions which led to the production of the city's spaces and formulated the movement of citizens within them. It is worth noting here that the Israeli neighborhoods developed in West Jerusalem in accordance with predetermined planning, direct public sector intervention in providing housing, and the allocation of lands to public institutions in order to transform West Jerusalem into a capital, while housing development in East Jerusalem depended on self-initiated private construction; therefore, some neighborhoods evolved without officially initiated planning. Furthermore, the city's subordination to Amman led to the loss of the national institutions that should have developed in it.

This physical and geopolitical division ended in 1967, in the wake of Israel's occupation of the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Following the occupation, the Israeli authorities officially controlled Jerusalem and sought to Judaize the space by establishing Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. The Israeli settlements isolated the center of East Jerusalem and the Old City from the surrounding Jerusalemite neighborhoods and the villages that had been

annexed to East Jerusalem in accordance with a decision by the Israeli authorities (e.g., Beit Hanina, Kafur Aqab, Al-Essawieh, Sour Baher, etc.). Israel annexed those villages and their lands to Jerusalem in an effort to expand the lands under its control (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003). The Israeli authorities also confiscated more than 25,000 dunams of Arab land for the purpose of establishing Jewish settlements, which was part of their policy to fragment and truncate Palestinian spatial continuity. Moreover, the Israeli authorities used spatial planning as a legalized means of controlling and inhibiting Palestinian expansion (Khamaisi, 2003). Hence, the Palestinian right to the city was minimized to the level of the neighborhood and the village, while the public space fell under Israeli administrative control and became subject to the Israeli authorities' decisions (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2006).

Since the Israeli occupation in 1967, Palestinian Jerusalemites have refused to take part in the local government or in managing, formulating or producing the space by participating in the Jerusalem Municipality. Although Israel granted the Palestinian Jerusalemites the right of permanent residency in the frame of its unilateral annexation of occupied Jerusalem under its official sovereignty, in contradiction to international legitimacy resolutions, it has refused to grant Palestinians in Jerusalem the right of citizenship. The goal sought by the Palestinian Jerusalemites is to end the occupation, not to attain equality under Israeli control as citizens of the state of Israel. Thus, official and public Palestinian participation in producing the public city space, as a major component of ensuring their right to the city, is unthinkable under Israeli occupation institutions, because the occupation makes it impossible to realize this right, since the occupation itself, by definition, is imposed. Nevertheless, Palestinian Jerusalemite society witnessed significant economic prosperity and relative housing growth between 1967 and 1993. This included a population increase from 68,000 to over 300,000, and a housing increase in the Palestinian

villages annexed by Israel in 1967, an area which is known today as East Jerusalem. This relative prosperity and housing expansion occurred without the formation of an urban housing network, by which public space would be provided to ensure the right to the city for the city's inhabitants, as well as for those who interact with it. The goal formulated by the Israeli authorities was to ensure the judaization of all of Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Israel and its political center, and even as the world capital of the Jewish people. In order to realize this goal, administrative, planning and geopolitical restrictions were imposed on the Palestinian existence in Jerusalem to achieve the geo-demographic goal of limiting the Palestinian population in Jerusalem to preserve them as a minority, constrained to 30% or less of the total population of Jerusalem Municipality, as that areas is defined by Israel (Misselwitz et al., 2006). The planning of the path of the wall took this geo-demographic objective as a central component, as we shall illustrate later. It is worth noting here that between 1967 and 1993, Palestinian freedom of movement and settlement in the city space of East Jerusalem was restricted, especially from the villages surrounding the Old City. In the meantime, Palestinian settlement in West Jerusalem was prohibited for geopolitical reasons by Israeli prohibitions and inhibited mostly by Palestinian reluctance. This means that the concept of a functional metropolis was not realized in the Jerusalemite reality, although the regional spatial concept and the political and administrative divisions were realized as the Jerusalemite urban space expanded from Bethlehem in the south to Ramallah in the north (Khamaisi, 2003).

The year 1993 witnessed a truncation of the Palestinian right to Jerusalem following the city's closure and the denial of free Palestinian movement into it from its surroundings, which nourish the city. This closure occurred through the imposition of permanent and mobile (flying) military checkpoints on the roads leading into and out of Jerusalem. These checkpoints weakened Palestinian

movement into Jerusalem and inhibited its development. They allowed Israeli settlers to travel from the settlements surrounding Jerusalem into the city, while Palestinians who did not possess the right of permanent residency in the city were not allowed to enter it except after obtaining special permits, which were impossible to obtain in most cases, for either security or bureaucratic reasons. In the year 2003, the checkpoints began to be augmented by a separation wall, undermining functional and administrative extension and the continuity between Jerusalem and its surrounding, secondary, Palestinian cities and hinterland. The wall fragmented Palestinian neighborhoods located within the administrative borders of Jerusalem that had been delineated by Israel in 1967. It must be pointed out here that the closure and truncation of the Palestinian right began to worsen at the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987, which resulted in the closing of the city to free Palestinian movement by means of military barriers and checkpoints on the roads. Later, in 2000, the Second Intifada broke out and eventuated in the decision in 2003 to establish the separation wall, a wall that surrounds Jerusalem and effectively annexes the surrounding Israeli settlements to the city, while fragmenting the Palestinian neighborhoods on its outskirts.

The wall also has caused a division between the heart of the city – the Old City and its surroundings – and the nearby Palestinian neighborhoods which had become part of the city's urban and functional network (Brooks et al, 2005). In 2006, a wall was constructed on the northern perimeter, isolating Kafur Aqab and Qalandia from the Atarot Industrial Zone, and dividing the main Jerusalem-Ramallah Road from Qalandia to Dhahiet Al-Barid into two separate parts along its midline. Furthermore, construction work is now underway that will divide Dhahiet Al-Barid into two areas – one in East Jerusalem and another on the West Bank side of the wall. Similar divisions include isolating the Abu Dis area from Ras Al-Amoud. In fact, inspection of the wall's path reveals that ethno-demographic considerations and the residents' housing locations, in light of

national affiliations, constituted a basic tenet in charting the wall's path. For example, Israel kept outside the separation wall approximately 65,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites who hold Israeli identification cards that afford their holders the right of permanent residency in Jerusalem and entitle them to receive the services provided by Israel to its residents (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. The location of the separation wall within the urban fabric of the Jerusalem area. (Source: <http://alhaq.mits.ps/index.php/interactive-map/interactive-map-annexation-wall>)

Based on the above, it is clear that the Palestinian right to the Holy City underwent a process of control and restriction, until it was substantially reduced. That process began with the development of ethno-national neighborhoods at the beginning of the twentieth century and continued through the middle of the century in the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. In spite of Israel's unification attempt following the occupation of the Palestinian territories

in 1967, and the annexation of occupied East Jerusalem to the state of Israel, this rhetorical, official, selective unification on the basis of ethnic affiliation did not realize the right to the city. In fact, the attempt to annex the area kept it divided and fragmented, even though the physical barriers between the Palestinian and Israeli sections were abolished following the city's occupation in 1967. The enforced ethno-national fragmentation continued and inhibited any free participation pertaining to movement, settlement within the city's borders, or formulation of the urban space (Cohen, 1980).

The First Intifada marked the beginning of the development of spatial separation, which eventually became military/security closure by means of the wall's construction. During this period, the security and trust space within the city and its surroundings shrank, while fear space and areas of distrust expanded. The security and trust space shrank to the level of the neighborhoods, while the fear space included seam areas between the Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods. Following the closure, the wall was constructed to isolate the city from its surroundings and exacerbated the city's fragmentation and division on ethno/national, demographic and spatial bases. The Israeli claim that it was providing personal and public security, in addition to national geo-demographic security, was a major motivator for constructing and determining the path of the separation wall, but it also undermined the possibility of providing and developing the right to the city for its citizens and residents, as well as for whoever else claimed Jerusalem as their city and center. Hence, Palestinian Jerusalemites have not enjoyed the right to citizenship since Israel's occupation of Jerusalem in 1967; it led to their absence and excluded them from making official collective decisions in formulating and forming the city space and producing Jerusalem's structure and network in response to their requirements and desires.

The geopolitical and ethno-demographic transformations in Jerusalem's reality

inhibited local participation in devising, formulating and shaping the space and its urban network. Thus, the formation of the Jerusalemite space has been imposed on the city from above (by the central authority) in response to geopolitical considerations and by means of Israeli governmental intervention; the role of the citizens/residents in forming the space has been limited and differs between the Israelis and the Palestinians; Israelis participate in electing their representatives in the local government and in reviving their civic society, while the Palestinians refuse to participate in shaping and forming the space, and even resist the decisions imposed on them. This imposition of decisions affirms the Israeli rejection of Palestinians' right to the city, and this rejection is enforced and underscored by the wall's construction.

Rejection of the Palestinian Right to the City following the Wall's Building

Some may think that the wall's effect on the Palestinians' right to the city is based on a technical or functional viewpoint, implying that dismantling the barrier will restore the right to city and render it an open city, offering freedom of movement and settlement. Israelis argue that the constructed wall is a "temporary fence" that can be dismantled and removed in the case of stability and agreement on a geopolitical arrangement, although history argues that whatever Israeli measure is introduced as "temporary" becomes a permanent component of the occupation. In other words, the position that the wall's construction is a technical matter is false, and the wall is indeed constructed to realize geopolitical goals which can be presented as a basis for future borders. We argue that the wall's construction in the case of Jerusalem is a central component in the Israeli rejection of the Palestinian right to Jerusalem, both spatially and functionally. In this section, I will provide an overview and discuss how the wall became a major factor in fragmenting and dividing the Holy City and in maintaining Israel's rejection of the Palestinian right to the city in terms of participation, appropriation and ensuring the right to citizenship.

The decision to construct the wall and fence surrounding Jerusalem stemmed primarily from security considerations. The concept of security, in the Israeli interpretation, is broad and includes personal individual security as well as public and national security. Before the wall's construction, geopolitical, ethno-demographic, administrative and spatial policies were devised to ensure Israeli control over Jerusalem, in order for it to stand as the capital of the state of Israel and the Jewish people (Hoshen et al., 2004). Therefore, the Israelis worked tirelessly to change the nature of the city and ensure that a Jewish majority lives in it. The borders demarcated in 1967 as Jerusalem's municipal borders were based on geopolitical and demographic considerations (Hazan, 1995), and the wall's construction came to consolidate those considerations. The question raised in the wake of the wall's construction is: "Will the right to the city be provided to those who inhabit it, or does the wall simply represent an additional step in the rejection of the Arab Palestinians' right to the city?" Below we will provide a brief answer to this question by outlining the effects of the wall on the city's structure and network, on movement within it, and on its relations with its urban and geopolitical surroundings. We shall discuss the ramifications of the wall from the standpoint of the Lefebvrian idea and through its four components, which underlie the realization of the right to the city: participation, appropriation, space production and urban citizenship.

The Right to City Participation Following the Building of the Separation Wall is Impossible

The right of Palestinian Jerusalemites to participate in decisions and to play a major role in the distribution of resources has become very uncertain in the wake of the construction of the wall, for two main reasons. The first is the Israeli desire, through governance and domination on the central as well as the local levels, to

enforce the judaization of Jerusalem and transform it into a city with a Jewish Israeli majority. Immense resources are being allocated for this purpose. Thus, development gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods are maintained, and Palestinian public and private sector investment in developing Palestinian neighborhoods is prohibited, or at least impeded. This pushes the Palestinian upper and middle classes to abandon those neighborhoods, contributing to a reduction of the Palestinian presence in the city. The Israeli government and Jerusalem Municipality repeatedly make pledges to provide and allocate resources for developing the Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, including re-planning them, but these rhetorical pledges are not accompanied by the allocation of appropriate resources to ensure effective Palestinian participation. The Israeli government and Jerusalem Municipality reject the principle of equal Palestinian participation in managing the city and sharing its resources in accordance with agreed-upon principles and criteria. Moreover, the Israeli government and Jerusalem Municipality devise and implement policies that ensure their ownership of Jerusalem and marginalize the Palestinians living in the city as a minority, who are provided with a minimum level of resources with which to fight a battle of survival. The wall's construction presents the Israeli government with a dilemma: if it wishes to annex the Palestinian Jerusalemites left within the wall, whose number stands at approximately 250,000, as permanent residents, then it has to provide them with resources and accept their participation in making decisions pertaining to managing the city. This is rejected by the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality (Garb, 2004), and this rejection will be enforced in the wake of the wall's construction, will lead to a deterioration of the conditions in Palestinian neighborhoods and will contribute to the transformation of those neighborhoods into peripheral isolated enclaves separated by the wall from the adjacent Palestinian neighborhoods. This is all done in the name of the judaization of Jerusalem.

The second reason pertains to the Palestinian position on participation. Palestinian Jerusalemites living in the city, as well as those interacting with it and aspiring for it to be the capital of the Palestinian state and its economic, cultural and administrative heart, reject participation with the Israeli occupier. Transforming the issue of Jerusalem from a geopolitical and occupation issue into an issue of ensuring citizenship and services is inconceivable from a Palestinian standpoint. Palestinians also reject seeing the issue of Jerusalem as a functional issue or an issue of services in the wake of the wall's construction, which is exactly what the Israelis seek to make of it. Therefore, Palestinians refuse to participate in the municipal elections. They are also suspicious and disapproving of the local administrations set up by the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality, although many administrative positions are manned by Palestinians. Undoubtedly, the wall's construction and the physical isolation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites from their brethren in Jerusalem's surroundings, including the cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem, present the Palestinian Jerusalemites with their own dilemma: they possess conditional residency rights in Jerusalem and can theoretically demand to participate in decision making and share resources and power, but the Israeli government's efforts to transform the issue of Jerusalem from a sovereign political negotiation issue into a municipal services issue implicitly discredits the viewpoints presented by some Palestinian Jerusalemites that they should participate in the Jerusalem Municipality to create a Palestinian lobby that will protect certain Palestinian interests. On the other hand, the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality impose their policies and decisions, and even their taxes, on the Palestinian Jerusalemites, who are obliged to adhere to Israeli law without enjoying services in return for their taxes. In other words, the Palestinian Jerusalemites fulfill their duties, including their imposed financial obligations, in return for their conditional residency, without receiving proportional municipal services and civil rights.

This reality has existed since 1967, but it will be exacerbated in the wake of the wall's construction because it will transform the issue of the Palestinian Jerusalemites into a functional and service issue, and they will become connected to their Palestinian state through border crossings erected along the wall. The rejection of the equal mutual participation of the Palestinians and Israelis in the case of Jerusalem is a central component in undermining and truncating the Palestinians' right to Jerusalem. The impossibility of participation maintains class and national segregation and exacerbates the differences between East and West Jerusalem, inequalities which hinder security and stability and deny collective responsibility for managing the city and distributing or sharing the resources and power in it.

Enforcing the Denial of the Right to Appropriation Following the Building of the Separation Wall

Providing the right to appropriation represents one of the major components of the right to the city. Lefebvre (1996) pointed out that appropriation is a spatial practice whose growth is proper, appropriate and natural for the sake of meeting and expanding human needs and potentials. The right to appropriation includes the residents' right to free utilization and occupation of the urban space and free personal access to it without any hindrance. Lefebvre (1996) explained that the right to appropriation also has a broader meaning, which includes the right to produce and occupy the general space in accordance with the residents' needs and requirements. This broader definition assumes that one of the components of appropriation is the production of urban space and surroundings in a manner that enables residents to use them fully and completely. Undoubtedly, the wall produces a space that the Palestinians have no role in creating, possess no right to appropriate, and even oppose, although the Israelis claim that Palestinian violence has threatened Israeli security and provided the motive for the wall's construction. Given the fact that the wall isolates Palestinian Jerusalemite

neighborhoods from each other (as in the case of the Dhahiet Al-Barid area, and in the isolation of Beit Hanina village from the new Beit Hanina), it restricts appropriation to the level of private personal space and cancels the public city space which ought to serve the Palestinian Jerusalemite citizens.

An inspection and analysis of land uses and appropriations in the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods reveal that the idea underlying the planning of those neighborhoods was to avoid the creation of public city spaces within them (Khamaisi, 2003, 2006). Detailed master plans were devised for each neighborhood or village in accordance with a restrictive methodology whereby land uses were not appropriated adequately for the general aim of serving the populations or being available for use by the population of the entire city. The planning and administrative concept imposed by the Israeli government was counteracted by a traditional local/village concept in the neighborhoods and villages that were encompassed by the administrative borders of the Jerusalem Municipality following the occupation of 1967, like Shu'fat, Sour Baher, Um Tuba, and Al-Essawieh. This traditional concept was unsupportive of the appropriation of private lands for public purposes and avoided attracting immigrants. The divergence of these contradictory interests resulted in an absence of public city space and in further fragmentation of the functionally disintegrated urban structure in East Jerusalem. The separation wall enforces this fragmentation on two levels: first, it divides the structure of the neighborhoods, with some parts inside the wall and others outside, and second, it enforces a continuation of the local/village nature, in spite of the urbanization process in the Palestinian neighborhoods, without forming any public city space. Given the fact that the national geopolitical role of East Jerusalem was marginalized and truncated as Palestinian governmental and administrative centers settled outside the wall, the need to provide public city space became a luxury and was essentially not required, because functional subjugation was enforced between

the neighborhoods and urban units and the local and governmental authorities, which possess the resources and the power. Of course, this reality did not fulfill Palestinian needs and potentials in Jerusalem.

The wall's enforced denial of the Palestinian right to appropriation in the city was felt on a tangible level in the severing of transportation and the failure to provide a road network connecting the Palestinian neighborhoods and contributing to free movement into, between and within them. Meanwhile, no lands that exceeded neighborhoods' uses were appropriated for public city purposes, for instance, for a municipal soccer stadium, a service center, a public library, a court, etc. The formulators and managers of the space in the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli government claim that Palestinian Jerusalemites can theoretically use the public space that was created to serve the Israeli Jews in West Jerusalem. They argue that Jerusalem is a united city and that no duplications in land use should be created on the collective city level. However, for all practical purposes, Palestinians are barred from using this public space, which was created at their expense and does not meet their needs and desires. Hence, the Palestinian occupation and utilization of the city space is shrinking to that which is occupied by their bodily physical existence. Moreover, their continuity with the Palestinian surroundings that feed them functionally – including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the entire Arab and Muslim world – has been severed, creating a structural crisis and minimizing the mobility of the population from the city level to the local level of neighborhoods and villages, thereby causing further fragmentation in the spatial distribution of the city's parts and inhibiting the development of a civic leadership who could represent the population and the interests of the Palestinian Jerusalemites. In fact, what happens and what is being developed is a phenomenon whereby traditional local groups try to represent people's interests on the local level. This phenomenon was witnessed in dealings with the Israeli government to determine

the wall's path, when local groups sought to conduct minimal localized modifications of the path of the wall, to reduce local damage and maintain local contiguity (such as Dhahiet Al-Barid, Sour Baher, and Abu Dis / Al-Quds University), after losing hope in the possibility of stopping the wall's construction on the collective level. Moreover, Palestinian collective representation concentrates on the geopolitical dimension as a central factor in changing and improving the reality of Jerusalem and does not give enough weight to functional living considerations for the Palestinian residents. Similarly, the national Palestinian collective representation prohibits local representation from granting legitimacy to space appropriations imposed by the Israelis. This reality will worsen following the wall's construction. The shortage of land allocated for public use will stifle new economic opportunities within Palestinian Jerusalemite society, and the separation of the Palestinian Jerusalemite society from its Palestinian extension on the outer side of the wall will lead to two contradictory, albeit integrated, operations. On one hand, Palestinian entry into Jerusalem will decrease, transforming the city from a national center and central city that provides services to the entire Palestinian population (e.g., educational, health and tourist services) into a city lacking such services after they desert Jerusalem or are forced to relocate to the outer side of the wall in order to serve the Palestinians living outside the city and the wall. On the other hand, the number of consumers of such services inside Jerusalem will decrease constantly as the Palestinian Jerusalemite population inside the wall shrinks. This trend will make it economically and functionally unfeasible to maintain the existence and development of such institutions, leading to their closure and relocation to the outer side of the wall and exacerbating Palestinian Jerusalemite subjugation to Israeli city service institutions which do not meet their needs.

Therefore, the wall's construction will interfere with the right to free Palestinian appropriation in Jerusalem, leading in the end to a void in public and private

spatial formation in East Jerusalem and transforming it from a city that had begun to formulate its urban structure into a collection of local residential concentrations that are fragmented, existing without city components, and lacking a city center that unifies, serves and polishes them.

Reproduction of the City's Space on the Outer Side of the Wall

The wall's construction remade Jerusalemite physical city space and its relations with its inside and surroundings. The reproduction of space goes far beyond the process of planning physical sites in the city to actually formulating and producing whatever has to do with life in the city. Providing the right to the city and producing the space require reshaping power relations and the distribution of resources, and transferring them from the central authorities to local residents and their representatives, taking into consideration equality in the distribution of resources in accordance with needs, in order to prevent the creation of gaps among the residential groups, regardless of their national or ethnic belongings and affiliations. We cannot expect the demarcation of the borders of the city's spaces, which is imposed by the Israelis through construction of the wall and the separation fence, to reformulate/reshape power relations, the distribution of resources and the production of the space, especially in light of the experiences of mixed Arab/Jewish cities in Israel, such as Jaffa-Tel Aviv, Lod, Ramle, Haifa and Akko, where Jewish groups dominate Arab groups. Although both groups are citizens of the state, Arabs in those cities suffer from dual discrimination on the national and city levels (Falah, 1996). Reduction of the Palestinian Jerusalemite population on the inner side of the wall may alleviate the perceived ethno-demographic pressure that accompanies the formulation of urban policies and plans in Jerusalem at the hands of Israeli government apparatuses and the Israeli municipality. Alleviation of the ethno-demographic pressure and transformation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites into a divided and fragmented minority, with no collective city leadership and no functional city institutions

capable of demanding the redistribution of resources and making decisions concerning production of the space, increases the deterioration of living conditions for the Palestinians, including the levels of services and infrastructure. Rejection of the principle of a Palestinian Jerusalemite collective demanding to share the resources and power under Israeli sovereignty leads Israeli decision makers and distributors of resources to overlook Palestinian needs. The reduction of resources allocated for the Palestinians, coupled with an increase in the requirements for urban life, contribute to a widening of the gap between what is provided by the municipality and what is required by the citizens.

The nonparticipation of the Palestinians with respect to producing the space and sharing resources and urban decisions will exacerbate the Palestinians' estrangement in the city and force them to produce the space without taking their interests and needs into consideration. The gaps between Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods will widen and will lead to a lack and unavailability of services and infrastructure, the disappearance of economic and administrative opportunities, and the deterioration of the quality of life. The widening gaps will increase the spaces of estrangement and fear between the Israeli and Palestinian societies and increase instability, especially as the younger generations enter the chain of demanding appropriate city services in an era of globalization and openness. These young generations will not be indifferent to the production and imposition of space without their playing an effective role. In other words, Israel's refusal to share production of the city's space will threaten stability in the city and lead to conflicts that may reach the level of violent confrontations between the Palestinians and Israelis within the city's spaces, conflicts based on the gaps and on the control of resources packaged by the national geopolitical conflict.

It is worth pointing out that the wall will isolate the spaces inside the city from

their suburbs, as well as from the surrounding cities. Meanwhile, weak neighborhoods will evolve randomly between cities like Ramallah and Jerusalem. Also, the space inside East Jerusalem will become composed of separate disintegrated or heterogeneous spaces. The first such space will be the Old City and its surroundings, which suffer from economic weakness, coupled with residential concentration. The surrounding commercial centers will be weakened, and civil cultural life will become isolated and start moving to the cities outside the wall or to the western part of Jerusalem. The second space consists of the Arab villages and neighborhoods, which do not enjoy any contiguity or integration with each other. These neighborhoods will maintain a random urban openness in order to meet the population increase, but they will not be able to attract positive migration or provide national-city services within themselves. They may be transformed into something similar to ghettos, besieged by the wall as well as by the urban restrictions imposed by the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli government. The third space is the Israeli neighborhoods and the settlements that are isolated from the urban expansion west of Jerusalem by Palestinian neighborhoods west of the wall; these Israelis live in a state of conflict and heterogeneous competition. The wall will cancel, or at least freeze, the functional and spatial relationship between the Palestinian neighborhoods within the wall and others outside it, and will dwarf the role of Jerusalem and transform it from a central city in the heart of a nation to a partitioned, peripheral city suffering from the absence of a connected hinterland that feeds and pushes it.

The Dilemma of the Right to Citizenship

The idea of ensuring the right to the city originated from the idea of individuals' right to participate in decision-making on a national level, although their participation on the city level is limited. Part of the right to the city is the individual's and the society's right to formulate their opinions, ideas and

demands in regard to the extent of their activeness in the city space, and to make their opinions heard. This means that the right to the city enforces democratic participation locally as well as on the national level. The questions we put forward here are: "Does the wall's construction rearrange the relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites to provide city democracy, or do Palestinian Jerusalemites continue to be deprived of participation in Jerusalemite citizenship?" and "What does the answer to this question mean the reality of Jerusalem beyond the wall?"

To answer these questions, it is necessary first to examine the situation before the construction of the wall, which demonstrates that the wall contradicts the concept of the right to the city. Palestinian Jerusalemites have not been granted the right to participate in Israeli national elections (for the Knesset-Parliament), although they have been granted the right to participate in municipal elections. Participation in the national Palestinian elections was granted to the Palestinian Jerusalemites for the elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996 and 2006, but they were not allowed to form a Palestinian municipality. In return, and as pointed out earlier, Palestinian Jerusalemites do not exercise their right to participate in local elections and the municipal decision-making process. This voluntary refusal represents in part the rejection of the occupation on one hand, but on the other hand, full citizenship was not granted, or was not imposed, by Israel on the Palestinians due to internal (demographic and political) considerations. Instead, the Palestinians were granted only permanent residency rights, and most of them retained their Jordanian nationality and citizenship, even after Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988.

We do not expect this reality to change following the building of the wall. The Palestinians will remain deprived of citizenship rights and participation in the decision-making process. After construction of the wall, a new Jerusalemite

ethnic group may evolve in Israel. It will be a minority deprived of citizenship rights but subject to Israeli law. It will not be allowed to participate in national elections, but it will reject local elections. This contradictory reality will deepen the contradictions within the Jerusalemite Palestinian society and place it in a dilemma on the individual as well as the societal levels, and this includes individual behavior within the space. Furthermore, this reality will stand in the face of serious demands on the part of the Palestinians in Jerusalem to change the urban reality and to urge its acceptance by Israel and the Jerusalem Municipality, which controls the space and movement within it, and possesses the power and the resources to produce the space.

The construction of the wall, the detachments of urban expansion among the Palestinian neighborhoods, and the uprooting of Palestinian personal affiliations from the Palestinian political center will increase this contradictory situation. The situation may evolve to a re-drawing of a distinct Jerusalemite identity as a way out of these crises and contradictory conditions, as part of re-devising official citizenship, in addition, as a result of return for globalization, as proposed by Purcell (Purcell, 2002). Purcell uncovered three major changes in crystallizing citizenship and affiliation in the era of globalization, which were:

- Re-measuring citizenship
- Redoing the geographic distribution of citizenship
- Re-guiding citizenship away from the nation, which is considered the dominating political society, as well as away from the citizens, who are considered homogeneous entities.

Here, the idea of a multi-layered citizenship replaces the mode of citizenship based on the democratic liberal model (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This local model of citizenship is enforced by the fact that it stems from the concept of the right to the city, which was proposed by Lefebvre when he focused on inhabitancy as a basis for ensuring the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1991). Here, we raise the issue

of Israel's pushing the Palestinian Jerusalemites to develop a new kind of citizenship in the wake of the wall's construction, especially in light of the contradiction into which they drifted without having any role in its production.

It must be pointed out here that the suffering arising from the denial and truncation of the right to the city includes Jerusalemite males as well as females, and women are expected to suffer even more from the lack of needed services in the city. This conclusion was reached by various studies that focused on gender realities in the city's environs (Fenster, 2004; 2006).

Hence, construction of the wall raises issues pertaining to the problems of citizenship versus residency, and of political participation on the national versus the local level. These problems will worsen in the wake of the wall's construction and will generate efforts to solve them. These issues have ramifications and consequences for the daily lives of the Palestinians and the Palestinian existence in Jerusalem, especially in light of the fact that the distribution of financial resources and lands in the Jerusalemite reality, as it is the case in the Israeli reality in general, is organically tied to national and ethnic affiliations. The wall was constructed to enforce the Jewish and Israeli identities of Jerusalem, and this enforcement cannot occur in a vacuum, especially in the absence of equal citizenship and equal geopolitical participation, which are inhibited by the wall. In fact, the wall prohibits even thinking about these issues, since it is an outgrowth of the Israel ideology embodied in the slogan "We are here and they are there," a stance that adds to residential separation and the prevention of spatial participation.

Conclusion

The wall's construction created, and continues to create, the space of the city of Jerusalem and the relations among the residents and citizens of the city. The wall determines and controls the Palestinian right to the city. We have tried in this

paper to analyze the ramifications of the wall and its effects on the right to the city based on the Lefebvrian idea and concept of citizenship. Although we realize that this concept may be inappropriate for analyzing the conflict-ridden situation of Jerusalem, it adds a relevant additional dimension to our understanding of the relations in the conflict. In a previous study, we discussed the wall's effects on Palestinian citizens (Brooks, et. al, 2005; Khamaisi et. al., 2010), and we demonstrated that the wall is shrinking and truncating Jerusalemite urban space, leading to its fragmentation and increasing the spaces of fear within the city. Moreover, the separation wall has undermined the development of Jerusalem as the urban, political and administrative heart of the Palestinian state, and deformed the natural organic development of the Jerusalemite urban state and its linkages with the cities and villages surrounding it, which feed it and drive its development.

However, in this paper we have focused on how the construction of the wall will serve as a means of denying the right to the city. Traditional localization in the neighborhoods and villages will be consolidated; therefore, no urban or rural state will be developed, while freedom of movement within this city space shrinks. The results of the construction of the wall are the formulation and production of a space that is incapable of ensuring equal Palestinian participation in its development, and an undermining of the fair and equitable distribution of resources and participation in the urban divisions. The incomplete residency/citizenship that is conditionally imposed on the Palestinian Jerusalemites confuses them and leaves them with a dilemma that they have no ability to manage, in a situation characterized by a contradictory fluctuation between ethnic and national affiliations, between belonging on the local and societal level and obtaining decent living conditions on one hand, and achieving national political aspirations on the other.

Undoubtedly, the wall transforms Jerusalem from a condition of centrality to a condition of marginalization as a peripheral border city. This transformation leads to a minimalization of the general space until it disappears, which means that the city becomes composed of discontinuous and heterogeneous residential groups with varied levels of infrastructure and quality of life. All of this makes it difficult to utilize Jerusalem as a central city and as the urban heart of the state of Palestine. And there may be no short-term solutions to the dilemmas involved.

We must point out here that the separation wall practically undermines the concept of the open city, which is integral to the concept of the right to the city. Achievement of an open city is still pending in the case of a city divided ethnically, culturally and politically. The concept of the open city does not mean that there are no administrative or political borders within the city. Rather, it means that those borders are permeable, so that an individual, a family or an economic enterprise can move and settle freely within the city's space and can cross borders easily and fluidly. The concept of the open city rejects the erection of physical borders within the city and within its surroundings. The construction of the wall has practically cancelled this idea and vision of the open city, which is being demanded by a multitude of citizens and activists for the sake of devising a geopolitical arrangement for the future of Jerusalem. In return, as it erodes the concept of the open city, the wall undermines the concept of the right to the city. This right is theoretically true for the Israelis, but the Palestinians are deprived of it. However, the wall increases the formation of spaces of fear, thereby leading both ethnic/national groups to a feeling of insecurity and pushing them towards more polarization within the city.

In the end, it must be pointed out that the wall cannot ensure stability and prosperity for the city; on the contrary, it will maintain the state of conflict in it. Experiences of divided cities like Berlin, Nicosia, Beirut, Johannesburg and

Belfast confirm that a wall in a city's space cannot transform it into a central city. On the other hand, the removal of walls has contributed to the development of cities and restored their centrality, as in the case of Berlin. Meanwhile, the Israeli desire to legitimize its control over Jerusalem following construction of the wall is not materializing. This means that there is no alternative but to propose agreements that ensure the Palestinian right in the city for all its citizens in order to push the city toward stability, development and prosperity, since the wall blocks such a vision for the city. This also means that both the Israelis and the Palestinians must guarantee their mutual interests in ensuring the right to the city. Further increases in Israeli domination over Jerusalem following construction of the wall cannot transform the city into an Israeli center, and the Israelis must realize that their interests in Jerusalem cannot be ensured through the erection of walls, but rather by recognizing the Palestinians' right to the city and facilitating the realization of this right by reproducing the space in a way that creates a Jerusalem that forms the heart and capital of the Palestinian state.

It can be concluded from this study that it is impossible to realize the concept of Israel's right to the city even after establishing the separation wall and imposing Israeli control over both the east and west of Jerusalem, because the city is being transformed into a border or frontier city. Furthermore, the wall has effectively ruled out the idea of Jerusalem's becoming the capital of the Palestinian state and its political, administrative and functional heart, transforming it instead into a truncated, marginalized city. In fact, there is currently no physical, spatial functional or even social integration among the Arab neighborhoods inside the city. The fragmentation created by the wall and by Jerusalem's isolation from its surroundings contributes to the virtual lack of contiguity and integration between the Old City and its surroundings. This includes, on one hand, its connections to the commercial centers in Sheikh Jarrah and on Salah Eddin Street, and, on the other hand, its connections to surrounding neighborhoods and villages, which

have developed small secondary centers and formed additional neighborhoods that serve themselves. The above developments have caused a decline in the number of Palestinian national institutions in Jerusalem, several of which have deserted Jerusalem for surrounding cities such as Ramallah. By contrast, the wall has created outer areas that used to be affiliated with Jerusalem, but now are excluded and suffer from a dual marginalization. Kafur Aqab is but one example.

Finally, the separation wall pushes Jerusalem into further deterioration and decline, accelerating negative migration out of it, especially by members of the upper and middle classes. The fact that only the poorer classes do not leave Jerusalem will exacerbate the conflict in it, especially in the wake of its transformation into a frontier city. These negative ramifications will increase in the wake of Israel's implementation of the proposed unilateral "convergence/ consolidation/ realignment" plan, thereby exacerbating the city's deterioration, even if the plan entails the removal of Palestinian neighborhoods outside the wall.

In conclusion, the argument of this paper underscores the need to remove the wall for the sake of the city and its citizens, as well as for the sake of ensuring human civil rights and citizenship in Jerusalem. Continuing to ignore the immense dangers imposed by the wall on Jerusalem, in the short or long term, constitutes a crime against the city, its citizens and those who love it.

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