موقف ابن تيمية من الحد المنطقي

Abstract

This article deals with Ibn Timiyyah’s criticism of Aristotle’s ‘definition’. It focuses on the two ‘points of definition’: the negative, and the positive. The negative point argues that the required ‘concept’ cannot be achieved except by definition. The positive point argues that definition benefits the sciences by ‘concepts’. Ibn Timiyyah tries to prove that definition does not lead to the revelation of the facts and truths of things and their quiddities, neither does it help in developing the sciences. We notice that his main criticism is directed at the metaphysical elements of definition such as genus, species, differences (differentia/ divisions), quiddity, and universality. He argues that these elements are purely mental, and they do not necessarily correspond the existence.

I believe that Ibn Timiyyah tries to differentiate between metaphysics and the concrete physical world, arguing that not all that comes to mind is necessarily corresponds the existing objects in the concrete physical world. Therefore, human knowledge should be established on concrete rules that are subject to experiment. He refuses the logic of quiddity that depends on pure intellect and calls for an experimental logic that is devoid of metaphysics.